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In a recent analysis, Kadmon and Landman (1993) propose that any is 
univocally an indefmite . It has free choice (FC) readings in modal contexts 
where indefmites get universal force and negative polarity (NPI) readings in 
negative contexts . It is barred from non-negative/non-modal contexts by a 
licensing principle that requires statements with any to strengthen statements with 
ordinary indefmites . In this paper I show that Fe readings of any are available 
in non-modal (and non-negative) contexts if there is a relative clause inside the 
NP and argue that any must be recognized as a universal . A consequence of this 
is that strengthening can no longer be used to explain the distribution of any . The 
alternative proposed here is that any is an inherently modal particle and signals 
lack of commitment with respect to the existence of individuals in its domain. 
It cannot occur in non-negative/non-modal contexts because the existence of such 
individuals is entailed. A relative clause over-rides this constraint by carving out 
a possibly empty subset of the individuals denoted by the head noun. The 
interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors is shown to account for hitherto 
unexplained facts about the distribution and behavior of any in a variety of 
contexts. 
I: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVOCAL ANY 
1.1. "Any " as Universal 
Analyses of English any have focused on its distribution and chameleon 
like interpretation. It is well-documented that it is licensed in negative, more 
generally, downward entailing, contexts and in the presence of modals . The basic 
generalizations can be illustrated by the examples in (1 )  and (2) : 1  
(l)a. John didn't talk to any woman. 
b .  Any owl can hunt mice. 
c .  Any owl hunts mice. 
(2)a. * John talked to any woman. 
b. * Any man didn't eat dinner. 
c. * Any woman contributed to the fund . 
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Closely related to the distribution of any, is the question of its interpretation. The 
generalization based on the canonical cases given in (1) above, is that it is 
interpreted as a narrow scope existential or a wide scope universal when it occurs 
in downward entailing contexts such as (la) (PS any); as a wide scope universal 
when it occurs in a modal context as in (lb) and (lc) (Fe any) . The question that 
has dogged analyes of the phenomenon since the very beginning is whether there 
are two lexical items that happen to be homophonous or whether there is only one 
item which behaves differently depending on the context. 
A univocal account proposed by Quine (1960), Vendler (1967) , Lasnik 
(1972) , Kroch (1974) , LeGrand (1975) and Eisner (1994) takes any to be a 
universal taking scope over negation and modal operators . Apart from the fact 
that the particular scope properties of any remain unaccounted for, there is 
convincing evidence that PS any must be an existential . 2 (3a) from Carlson 
(1980) , for example, has only a de dicto reading. If any were a universal that 
must take scope over negation, an unambiguously de re reading would be 
predicted. (3b) from Ladusaw (1979) , on the other hand, is ambiguous between 
universal and existential readings (Is it possible for each person to pledge ATO?  
vs. Is it possible for some person to pledge ATO?) .  An ordinary universal or 
indeftnite would each have one reading. (3c) , attributed by Lee and Hom (1994) 
to Sabine Iatridou, shows that any allows donkey anaphora and this aligns it, once 
again, with indeftnites : 
(3)a. Bob does not think that there is anyone from Greece in his basement. 
b. Can anyone pledge ATO? 
c. If any fanner owns a donkey, he beats it. 
The examples in (3) show that any cannot be equated with a wide scope universal, 
suggesting that it must be lexically ambiguous. Ladusaw (1979) and Carlson 
(1980) explicity argue for this and Hom (1972) inclines towards this view. 
What makes such a conclusion somewhat unsatisfying, however, is the fact 
that the paradigm in (1) ,  (2) and (3) is quite common across languages . There 
are items in languages such as Hindi (Davison 1978, Dayal 1995), Basque (Laka 
1990) or Japanese (Kawashima 1994), to name a few, that display the same 
pattern of behavior. A univocal account would be preferable since it seems 
implausible to posit homophony for all languages with items similar to any. 
1.2. "Any " as Indefinite 
Following on the analysis of quantiftcational variability of ordinary 
indefmites in Lewis(1975) , Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) , Kadmon and 
Landman (1993) argue quite persuasively for a univocal account of any as 
indefinite. According to them, any is an indefmite which gets interpreted as 
universal in precisely those contexts where ordinary indeftnites have a generic 
interpretation. A similar position is also taken by Lee and Hom (1994) . Here 
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I focus primarily on K&L's approach, the key features of which are given below : 
(4) (A)any CN = the corresponding indefInite NP + additional 
semantic/pragmatic characteristics (i.e. widening and 
strengthening) contributed by any. 
The sole difference between PS any and FC any lies in the 
interpretation of the indefInite NP: in the case of FC any, 
it is an indefmite interpreted generically. 
(B)Widening: In an NP of the form any CN, any widens the 
interpretation of the common noun phrase along a 
contextual dimension. 
(C)Strengthening: Any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates 
a stronger statement. That is, only if the statement with 
any CN entails the corresponding statement with a CN. 
Though this approach is extremely appealing, I want to revive the question 
of any being a universal by drawing attention to the data in (5), which are parallel 
to (2) . The only difference is the presence of a relative clause : 
(5)a. John talked to any woman who came up to him . 
b. Any man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner. 
c. Any woman who heard the news contributed to the fund . 
Licensing of any by relative clauses has been discussed in LeGrand (1975) under 
the term subtrigging, as well as by Davison (1980) and Carlson (1981) .3 
However, it has not featured in any signifIcant way in recent literature. 
Subtrigged any has a FC reading and passes Hom's and Carlson's 
diagnostics of taking modifIers that only universal determiners take, namely 
almost and absolutely, and of allowing for exception phrases: 
(6)a. John talked to almost/absolutely any woman who came up to him. 
b. John talked to any woman who came up to him except Sue. 
What is interesting about the FC reading of subtrigged any is that it cannot 
be an instance of a generic indefmite. An indefmite in the same position does not 
have universal force, as shown in (7) : 
(7)a. John talked to alsome woman who came up to him . 
b .  Alsome man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner. 
c. Alsome woman who heard the news contributed to the fund. 
The closest equivalents of the sentences in (5) are the corresponding sentences 
with a universal, given in (8) : 
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(8)a. John talked to every woman who came up to him. 
b. Every man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner. 
c. Every woman who heard the news contributed to the fund. 
The subtrigging cases show quite clearly that it is not possible to reduce 
all FC readings of any to the presence of an NP external generic operator. 
K&L's attempt to assimilate the universal to the existential thus cannot be 
maintained. 
1.3. A Quasi Univocal Account 
If the universal quantificational force of at least some FC readings of any 
is NP internal, we have to recognize that NP's  with any can be universals.  Given 
the facts in (3) ,  however, one cannot reasonably hope to assimilate all cases of 
any to the universal but neither would one want to revert to the view that there 
are two unrelated any's in the language. The proposal I want to make here is that 
there is only one morphological item which can attach to universals or to 
indefinites .  The shifts in interpretation follow from the fact that its host NP can 
be universal or indefinite, its non-standard distribution from the interaction of its 
inhererent meaning with the meaning of the rest of the sentence and the context 
of use . Since this is, in a sense, a univocal account of the phenomenon the 
similarity in distribution · and interpretation of items similar to any in other 
languages is not unexpected. 
The approach I am advancing is clearly in the spirit of K&L in that it 
decomposes an NP with any into two parts , a host NP and the semantic/pragmatic 
contribution of any. I have demonstrated in section 1 .2 the need to modify their 
proposal to allow any to attach to universals .  This seemingly minor change, 
however, leads to a non-trivial reassessment of the semantic/pragmatic properties 
of any. Let us illustrate with (5a) . 
Suppose the context is one where John is a candidate and is at a meeting 
where he wants to appear likeable to the female voters , maybe because the latest 
polls have shown him to be unpopular with them. A likely domain of 
quantification in this context may well be contextually restricted to female voters . 
(8a) would then describe a situation in which John talked to every woman voter 
who came up to him . If women who are not citizens came up to him, it would 
say nothing about whether John talked to them or not. (5a) could indicate some 
widening of the domain so that John might be claimed to have talked to even 
foreign women. Nationality would be one of the possible dimensions along which 
widening could take place though, of course, not the only one. This is not an 
implausible account of our intuitive understanding of the difference between (8a) 
and (5a) , though later we will refme this somewhat. 
Now, this account of the acceptability of any in (5a) is only viable if it can 
be shown that its presence strengthens the corresponding sentence with every. Of 
course, if John talked to every member of the union of the set of women voters 
and the set of foreign women, it follows that he talked to every member of each 
subset. Thus strengthening is satisfied and any is predicted to be licensed. The 
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problem, however, is that by similar reasoning (2a) John talked to any woman 
should also license any. For now, it can be compared not only to John talked to 
a woman where widening does not result in strengthening but also to John talked 
to every woman where it does. Thus, extending the K&L analysis to include 
universals robs it of its explanation for the distribution of any, one of its strongest 
features . 4 
In this paper I will advance the view that any is an inherently modal 
element, which indicates that quantification is over possible instantiations of 
nominalized properties as opposed to quantification over actual individuals .  S I 
propose a semantic constraint on its occurence which I dub non-existence. It says 
that an occurence of fNpany Pl in a statement tP is licit iff it does not entail 3PtP. 
This , of course, still allows any to occur in statements that in particular situations 
have individuals verifying <p.  In these cases, any is acceptable iff it satisfies a 
pragmatic requirement of contextual vagueness. This says that any is only 
appropriate in contexts where the speaker cannot identify the individual or 
individuals who verify <p. 
In advancing this proposal I will begin by focusing on subtrigged any in 
non-negative/non-modal contexts in order to isolate its core properties . I will 
then show how non-existence and contextual vagueness predict the distribution 
and behavior of any in a variety of contexts. The range of data covered include 
some facts that have been noted but not explained in earlier accounts, and some 
that may be new. 
n: SEMANTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBTRIGGED ANY 
2.1. Property-loaded Relotive Clauses 
In demonstrating how strengthening applies to universal any I made the 
standard assumption that the denotation of a common noun modified by a relative 
clause is simply the intersection of the sets denoted independently by the common 
noun and the relative clause. But this view of noun modification is not fme­
grained enough to capture some crucial distinctions relevant to subtrigging . We 
begin to get a better sense of what is at issue when we compare relative clauses 
that modify NP's  with any with those that modify NP's  with every. 
The first insight into subtrigging is provided by sentences such as (9a) . 
This sentence is ambiguous between a reading in which membership in the set 
denoted by the relative clause is accidental and one in which it is essential to the 
truth of the statement being made: 
(9)a. Every student who is in Mary's  class is working on polarity items. 
b. It happens to be true of every student who is in Mary ' s  class that he/she is 
working on polarity items. (accidental) 
c. Every student in Mary ' s  class, by virtue of being in her class, is working 
on polarity items . (essential) 
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Note that the distinction in question is not between restrictive and nOn­
restrictive/appositive uses of the relative clause. Both are instances of restrictive 
relativization; the universal determiner cannot take appositives,  and there is no 
intonation break surrounding the relative clause. 
Now, not every universal modified by a relative clause has this ambiguity . 
Consider ( lOa) and (lOb) which lend themselves to an accidental interpretation of 
the relative clause: 
(10)a. Every sttldent (who is) in Mary's  class happened to vote Republican. 
b. Every woman standing under that tree is Mary' s  friend. 
( l 1 a)-(l 1b) ,  on the other hand, are most naturally interpreted with membership 
in the relative clause as being essential : 
(l 1)a. The President thanked every soldier who had fought in the Gulf War. 
b. Everybody who attended last week's huge rally signed the petition. 
One way of isolating the essential reading is to add the phrase whoever 
they may be after the modified noun phrase; its meaning seems compatible only 
with that of the essential reading. Another diagnostic is to preface the statement 
with we didn 't keep a list of the individuals. . . .  These additions are easily 
incorporated into ( 1 1) ,  as shown in (13) .  Incorporating them into (10) ,  to the 
extent that it is even possible, has a semantic impact. In (12a) the choice of 
happen to seems to signal disbelief that the main clause event was a coincidence. 
In the case of (12b) , the addition is odd because it seems to call for an essential 
connection between the property of standing under a tree and the property of 
being Mary ' s  friend. 
(12)a.# Every sttldent (who is) in Mary 's  class, whoever they were, happened to 
vote Republican. 
b.# Every woman standing under that tree, whoever she may be, is Mary' s  
friend. 
( 13)a. We didn't keep a list of the names, but the President thanked every soldier 
who had fought in the Gulf War. 
b. Everybody who attended last week's huge rally, whoever they were, signed 
the petition. 
Thus one can safely take the distinction between accidental and essential 
uses of the relative clause to be real and also take the sentences in (10) to involve 
primarily the first reading, and the sentences in (1 1 )  to involve primarily the 
latter reading. 
Now, a clue to the semantics of any is revealed when we replace the 
universal in these sentences with any. The sentences in (14) substitute any for 
every in ( 1 0) and appear odd in precisely the same way that they appeared odd 
when we added whoever they nu:ry be in (12) .  Any substittlted into (1 1) ,  on the 
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other hand, is entirely natural . ( 15) is parallel to ( 13) :  
(I4)a.# Any student (who is) in Mary 's  class happened to vote Republican. 
b .#  Any woman standing under that tree is Mary's friend. 
( IS)a. The President thanked any soldier who had fought in the Gulf War. 
b. Anybody who attended last week's huge rally signed the petition. 
The generalization that emerges from this is that subtrigged any is compatible 
only with the essential reading of the trigger, i .e .  the relative clause, while 
subtrigged every has no such restrictions. 
One way of thinking of this difference is in terms of Property Theory of 
Chierchia (1984) . Here predicative expressions are systematically related to their 
individual level correlates via a nominalization operator and nominalized 
properties can be turned back into predicative expressions . 
( I6)a. Fido is a mammal = mammal'(t).  
b .  Mammals are smart = smart, (nmammal) 
A crucial aspect of this theory, for our purposes,  is that although u n  P - P valid, 
the theory distinguishes between them. The two terms are extensionally 
equivalent but differ in the mode of presentation. 
The standard semantics for relative clause formation treats the wh element 
like a lambda abstractor over an open proposition, yielding a set of individuals -
- an ordinary predicative expression. This would correspond to the accidental 
interpretation of the relative clause. On the other hand , if this predicative 
expression undergoes nominalization, it would represent the essential use of the 
relative clause. This would yield the representations in (17) for (9) : 
( I7)a. every(Xz[student'(z) & Xx[in Mary's class'(x)](z)]) (work on polarity' )  
b.  every(Xz[student' (z) & u n Xx[in Mary's class' (x)] (z)]) (work on polarity') 
In (I7a) , the determiner every takes as its ftrst argument the intersection of two 
predicative expressions. In (17b) , it takes that subset of the set denoted by the 
head whose members instantiate the nominalization denoted by the relative clause. 
The truth conditions of the (17a) and (17b) are identical and the context being 
extensional , they are both verifted with respect to the same individuals .  There 
is still a difference in the mode of presentation; the ftrst is individual-loaded while 
the second is property-loaded. That is, the statement in (I7a) is based on 
observation of individuals concerned, the particular predicates chosen simply help 
identify the individuals .  Any extensionally equivalent expression would work as 
well . The statement in (17b) makes crucial use of the property in question and 
the substitution of equiextensional properties would not be meaning preserving . 
To illustrate this point, suppose that Mary is teaching a seminar in 
semantics as well as a course on Field Methods . It so happens that all the 
advanced students are enrolled in both courses. Writing a paper on polarity items 
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could be an essential property of Mary's  students in the semantics seminar, but 
an accidental property of her students in field methods . Either version of ( 18) is 
true, and crucially the same individuals verify the truth of the statement. We can 
substitute who is in Mary 's Semantics seminar with the equiextensional property 
who is in Mary 's Fields Methods course because we can switch between a 
property-loaded statement (one which uses the relative clause in an essential way) 
to an individual-loaded statement (one which uses the relative clause in an 
accidental way) . 
( 18) Everybody who is in Mary's  semantics seminar/Field Methods course is 
writing a paper on polarity items. 
Based on our demonstration in (14) and ( 15) that any is compatible only 
with the essential use of the relative clause we predict that in the scenario 
described above, (19a) would be appropriate , modulo one qualification that will 
be introduced in the next subsection. But it would not be appropriate to make the 
substitution and say (19b) because a statement with any does not have the option 
of switching to an individual-loaded statement. 
(19)a. Anybody who is in Mary's  semantics seminar is writing a paper on polarity 
items. 
b .  * Anybody who is in Mary's  Fields Methods course is writing a paper on 
polarity items. 
2.2. Subtrigging and Discourse 
Focusing still on the relation between any and a universal NP as its host, 
consider the sentences in (20)-(2 1) which reveal differences between them having 
to do with their relation to discourse referents. Here the domain of the universal 
quantifier in the second clause is the set of individuals introduced explicitly in the 
first sentence. In each case, every is acceptable but any is not: 
(20)a. There were several/20 students at the lecture and every student who was 
there said it was inspiring . 
b .  * There were several120 students at the lecture and any student who was 
there said it was inspiring. 
(21)a. We have many graduate students but this year the graduate director met 
with every student in the graduate program individually to discuss their 
progress . 
b .  * We have many graduate students but this year the graduate director met 
with any student in the graduate program individually to discuss their 
progress. 
It may be worth pointing out that it is not the case that the sentences with every 
can take discourse antecedents only under the accidental reading of the relative 
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clause. This can be shown by prefacing such a sentence with a phrase that shows 
an essential use of the relative clause: 
(22)a. There were too many students at the meeting for me to keep track of them, 
but every student who was there raised his/her hand in favor of the 
motion. 
b. * There were too many students at the meeting for me to keep track of 
them, but any student who was there raised hislher hand in favor of the 
motion. 
Thus, these examples show that statementS with any differ not only from 
individual-loaded statements with every, but also from property-loaded statements 
with every. Any cannot have a discourse antecedent, or to put it another way, the 
domain of quantification for any cannot be contextually specified. 
Next consider contexts in which there is discourse anaphora in the second 
sentence to a preceding universal . Again, this is possible with every but not with 
any:6 
(23)a. Susan found every book she had been looking for at Borders . And What's 
more, they were on sale! 
b. * Susan found any book she had been looking for at Borders . And what's 
more, they were on sale ! 
(24)a.  Paul has interviewed every student who was at the scene of the crime and 
Kate has interviewed -them too. 
b. * Paul has interviewed any student who was at the scene of the crime and 
Kate has interviewed them too. 
(25)a. (I don't know who they are but) Paul is trying to find every student who 
was at the scene of the crime and Kate is trying to fmd them too. 
b. * Paul is trying to fmd any student who was at the scene of crime and Kate 
is trying to fmd them too. 
The unacceptability of the (b) versions of (23) through (25) can also be reduced 
to the constraint against the domain of quantification being contextually specified. 
As Kamp and Ryle (1993) explicate, plural discourse anaphora is dependent on 
a process of abstraction, which essentially collects every individual who satisfies 
the conditions in the complex NP and forms a set of those individuals .  This set 
then becomes available for subsequent discourse anaphora. In the case of (23a) , 
for example, a set would be created and made available at the matrix level 
whose members would be the individuals that are books and that Susan had been 
looking for and found at Borders : 
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(23)a' . x Y 
Susan(x) 
Y 
book(y) 
look-for(x,y) 
y = L y 
u=y 
on-sale(U) 
u 
Y 
book(y) 
look-for(x,y) 
found-at-B(x,y) 
Abstraction presupposes that a fInite, specifIable set of such individuals 
exists . Since quantifIcation in natural language is contextually restricted, it comes 
as no surprise that abstraction is possible in the case of a statement with every. 
The fact that abstraction is not possible in the case of a statement with any tells 
us that its domain crucially differs in not being contextually specifIable. Note 
once again that this is not a difference between individual-loaded statements with 
every vs. � .  property-loaded statements with any. (25) can take the phrase 
whoever they are so that it ·needn't be an individual-loaded statement but the 
version with every is perfectly acceptable . 
2.3. Iterability of Eventuality Described 
Finally , statements with every and any differ in the interpretation of the 
eventualities they describe. Consider (26) where matrix and embedded verbs are 
both non-stative: 
(26)a. That evening John misbehaved with everybody/anybody he talked to. 
b. John talked to everybody/anybody who came up to him at the party. 
Though both terms are acceptable, the statement with any suggests that there were 
several events of the relevant kind, while the statement with every is neutral in 
this regard. This difference can be better seen in (27) . In (27a) there is only one 
event of offering and any is ruled out, but (27b) is compatible with several such 
events and any is acceptable: 
(27)a. Bill offered Mary everything/*anything he had cooked for dinner. 
b. Those days Bill offered Mary everything/anything he cooked. 
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Both terms allow a matrix verb to be non-stative and the embedded verb 
to be stative, with the expected difference in interpretation between the two. 
Consider (28) : 
(28)a. John made a fool of himself in front of everyone/ anyone who was there. 
b . Mary sang for everyone/anyone who wanted to hear her. 
(28a) with any seems to suggest that there were several instances of John making 
a fool of himself while with every he need only have behaved foolishly once. 
Similarly, (28b) with any leads us to expect that Mary sang several times but not 
so with every. This is further confIrmed by examples like (29) where iteration 
of the event denoted by the main clause verb seems implausible and the 
acceptability of any is reduced: 
(29)a. John slipped in front of everyone/*anyone who was there. 
b. At 4 p.m. I saw John lecturing to everyone/*anyone who was near him. 
Next consider the combination of a stative in the matrix and a non-stative 
in the embedded clause. In (30a) any is acceptable under an interpretation for 
know, where with each encounter it became evident that John possessed that 
knowledge. Similarly, in (30b) any calls for several events of objects being 
placed in front of John and him expressing his liking for it. This is not so with 
every: 
(30)a. John knew every/any ianguage that we encountered on our trip . 
b. John liked everything/anything that was placed before him. 
What seems to be happening is that though the matrix verb is non-iterative, it is 
able to ride piggy back on the iterability of the embedded predicate . 
I should point out that the iteration of events we are looking at is not due 
to a need for universal any to take wide scope with respect to some other operator 
(here presumably an event operator) . (3 1) shows that any can take narrow scope, 
contrary to what is sometimes assumed about FC any: 
(3 1)  Every studenli read any book on giraffes theYi could fInd. 
If the pronoun inside the relative clause is read as bound by every student, the 
statement can only be about possibly different groups of books per student. 
Although there seems to be a tendency for the eventuality described to be 
interpreted as iterative, this is not necessary . (15a) , for example, could be 
prefaced to ensure that there is a single event of thanking : 
(32) At the end of his speech, the president thanked any soldier who had fought 
in the gulf war. 
Licensing any in Non-negativeINon-modal Contexts 
The generalization that emerges is that iterability of the event denoted by 
the matrix verb is sufficient to license subtrigged any and this iterability can be 
parasitic on the iterability of the event denoted by the embedded verb. But it is 
not a necessary condition for the licensing of any. 
2.4. Prenominal vs. Postnominal Modification 
We have determined so far that subtrigged any denotes a subset of the set 
denoted by the head noun, namely that subset whose members instantiate the 
property denoted by the relative clause. Crucially, the relative clause is 
interpreted in its essential use and the resulting subset is not contextually 
identifiable . While we have been looking primarily at modification by relative 
clauses, subtrigging is acceptable with other postnominaI modification too. as 
shown in (33a). Interestingly, however, prenominaI modification does not 
support any (Greg Carlson p .c . ) ,  as shown by the contrast between (33b)-(33c) : 7  
(33)a. John talked to any woman at the party. 
b. John talked to any politician who is powerful. 
c. * John talked to any powerful politician. 
Bolinger (1967) argues that prenominal adjectives do not derive from 
predicative adjectives while postnominal adjectives do. He also claims that 
prenominal adjectives only express permanent properties. not those with a 
temporal spread. He bases these conclusions on the observation that a sentence 
like (34a) refers to a river that is characteristically navigable, while one like (34b) 
refers to a river that is temporarily navigable . Similarly. (35a) refers to people 
who are characteristically responsible while (35b) refers to people who are 
responsible for a particular act: 
(34)a. The navigable rivers are to the north. 
b. The rivers navigable are to the north. 
(35)a. The responsible people were punished . 
b .  The people responsible were punished. 
In a similar vein, Sadler and Arnold (1994) argue that prenominal 
modification is quasi-lexical, syntactic or morphological compounding at x.o level. 
while post-nominal modification is phrasal . As they put it, (34a) has a single 
compound property while (34b) has two separate properties . 
These insights , for present purposes, may be translated in the following 
way. Relative clauses are predicative expressions that can undergo 
nominalization. The resulting property-loaded interpretation of the modified noun 
phrase is crucial for licensing any. Prenominal adjectives would be expected to 
undergo nominalization too if they were predicative expressions, yielding a 
similar result for any. If we follow Bolinger and Sadler and Arnold in not taking 
them to be predicative expressions, they must be predicate modifiers . According 
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to Chierchia (1984) , natural language does not nominalize predicate modifiers. 
Thus the modified common noun that any has scope over in (33c) denotes a single 
property and has the same status as an unmodified common noun as far as 
licensing any goes. The contrast between (33b) and (33c) is parallel to the 
contrast we started out with, namely that between (5a) and (2a) . 
m: DISTRIBUTION AND BEHAVIOR OF ANY 
3. 1. Non-Existence and Contextual Vagueness 
We have now a better sense of the properties of subtrigged any and can 
tum to the task of explaining its distribution and behavior. The view I am 
proposing is that any is inherently modal in that it signals lack of commitment to 
the existence of individuals instantiating the property in question. In this I am 
echoing Vendler (1967) who said that complete verifiability is repugnant to an 
any proposition. Here I will show how non-existence and contextual vagueness 
operate. To recap, the first bars any from occuring in statements that entail the 
existence of individuals verifying the statement. In statements that lack this 
entailment, any can occur if the context of use makes clear that the speaker does 
not have direct knowledge of the relevant individuals. 
Let us begin with the contrast that had proved elusive for K&L's 
approach, repeated below. We focus here on universal any. Since this is an 
extensional context, indefinite any would assert existence whether there is noun 
modification or not and would straightforwardly be ruled out as violating non­
existence: 
(36)a. * John talked to any woman. 
b. John talked to any woman who came up to him. 
The explanation I suggest for this contrast turns on the view that universal 
quantification in natural language differs from universal quantification in predicate 
logic in presupposing a non-empty domain of quantification, a view that von 
Fintel ( 1994) traces back to Aristotle. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990) 
show that this is a presupposition and not an entailment since it is possible to 
deny existence without contradiction. Interestingly, the examples they use to 
illustrate this all involve relative clause modification. 
It seems, however, that in extensional contexts modified and unmodified 
NPs differ with respect to this test. Speakers note a significant contrast between 
(37a) , which may require some backtracking but is not contradictory ,  and (37b) , 
which is contradictory: 
(37)a. Mary read every book assigned last semester. Since there were no books 
assigned she read nothing. 
b. Mary read every book. Since there were no books she read nothing. 
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I will therefore adopt the view that in extensional contexts, the felicitous use of 
a universally quantified statement entails the existence of individuals satisfying the 
head noun but not of individuals satisfying the head noun and the relative clause. 
3.2. Extensional Contexts 
If the domain of unmodified universal terms is necessarily non-empty in 
extensional contexts non-existence predicts that any will be ruled out. This is 
what happens in (36a) . A postnominal modifier, on the other hand, can denote 
properties with a temporal spread, to adopt Bolinger's terminology. The resulting 
set is some subset of the set of individuals denoted by the head noun. This subset 
may or may not be empty. Non-existence is satisfied and any becomes possible, 
modulo satisfaction of vagueness. Let us demonstrate with (36b) how this may 
come about. 
Imagine, for example, that the speaker is at a party where he doesn't take 
note of all the women present but focuses his attention on John. In a short while 
he might well have enough evidence to decide that the property common to the 
women John talked to is simply that they came up to him. At some point, he 
stops watching John or maybe he simply doesn't take note of the women in 
question so that at the end of the meeting he would not be in a position to pick 
out the subset of women at the party who came up to John. He is now in a 
position to express the generalization in (36b) .& Everything he saw supports the 
truth of the statement, and furthermore, the set of individuals who would verify 
the truth of the statement is not contextually salient. The net effect is that the 
statement seems to be more about John's disposition rather than about John's 
actual behavior, as pointed out to me by David Dowty and Dick Oehrle .  
This example also illustrates why statements with subtrigged any tend to 
imply iteration of events . Iteration of events allow us to arrive at generalizations 
or regularities that focus on the properties that are criterial rather than on the 
individuals who are the bearers of such properties. They result in generic 
sentences of the kind that Carlson (1989) discusses. This environment is 
conducive to any since it lends itself to contextual vagueness. 
Recall though that iteration of events is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for licensing subtrigged any. A relevant example was (3:1.) , repeated 
below as (38) : 
(38) At the end of his speech, the president thanked any soldier who had fought 
in the gulf war. 
One might easily imagine the president thanking soldiers on a television or radio 
broadcast, where there is no group of soldiers in the visual domain. Another 
context that would license this use would be a large gathering of soldiers where 
the relevant subset has not been identified. In either case, the appropriateness of 
(38) is due to the relevant subset of soldiers not being contextually salient. 
The importance of contextual vagueness can also be demonstrated for 
(19a) , repeated below as (39) : 
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(39) Anybody who is in Mary's semantics seminar is writing a paper on Polarity 
Items. 
Suppose, for example, that the graduate director in his meetings with various 
graduate students, comes to realise that every student in Mary's semantics 
seminar that he talked to is working on polarity items. He may then conclude 
that this is not a coincidence, but part of the requirements of the course. If he 
is unaware or unsure or has forgotten whether the students on whom he is basing 
his generalization comprise all of the students in her seminar, he can use (39) . 
But if he is aware of the set of students in Mary's class he can only use the 
statement with every in it. 
We can conclude that any is acceptable in property-loaded statements 
because it leaves room for lack of direct knowledge of the set of individuals 
involved on the part of the speaker. The choice of individual-loaded statements , 
on the other hand, commits the speaker to direct knowledge of the members of 
this set. The difference between any and every with respect to discourse 
antecedents and anaphora that we saw in section 2.2 simply brings this out in a 
transparent way. 
Before we tum to downward entailing contexts, let us consider some cases 
where subtrigging does not have the usual effect: 
(40)a. There is every/*any book by Chomsky in this library. 
b. * There is every book by Chomsky in this library. Since he wrote no 
books, there are no books by him in the library. 
c. Is there any book by Ghomsky in this library? 
Although universal terms are generally disallowed in there-insertion contexts they 
may be acceptable under a special list interpretation. Their acceptability, 
however, seems to improve with postnominaI modification so that (40a) with 
every does not suggest a list interpretation. Leaving that aside, the point to note 
is that a there-insertion sentence with every resists the cancellation test; (40b) is 
a contradiction. This accords fully with the insights in Milsark (1974) or 
McNally (1992) . Predictably, any is ruled out by non-existence. 
As pointed out to me by Matthew Stone, any in there-insertion contexts 
is acceptable in questions because existence is not entailed, as shown in (4Oc).9 
It may be worth noting that (4Oc) is ambiguous here between indefinite and 
universal readings. The latter can be brought out by adding absolutely. 
Similar facts hold for (41a) ,  where the matrix clause has a verb of 
possession and embedded clause a stative verb: 
(41)a. John has every/*any book that Mary wanted. 
b. * John has every book that Mary wanted. Since she didn't want any , he 
doesn't have any book. 
c. Does John have any book that Mary wanted? 
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The explanation for the distribution of any here would be parallel to the there­
insertion case . 10 
3.3. Downward Entailing Contexts 
It is a corollary of the non-existence clause that any would be acceptable 
in the scope of negation. Take the cases discussed in section 1 . 1 ,  repeated 
below: 
(42)a. John didn't talk to any woman (who came up to him). 
b. Any man *(who saw the fly in the food) didn't eat dinner. 
There are two possibilities to consider, one where the host NP is indefInite and 
the other where it is universal . 
If the host is indefInite, an If in which negation has narrower scope will 
assert the existence of an individual verifying the statement and be ruled out. If 
negation cannot take scope over an indefmite in subject position, the 
unacceptability of indefInite any in (42b) is explained. There is, however, cross­
linguistic variation with respect to this fact. Hindi, Japanese and Basque do 
license NPI in subject position. Following Laka (1 990), I assume that the phrase 
structure of some languages places negation higher than the subject (see also 
Kawashima 1 994 for Japanese) . And in these languages non-existence can be 
respected with an NPI in subject position. 
Universal any, on the other hand, is possible in subject position in English 
as shown by the effect of subtrigging in (42b) . The interesting thing is that (42b) 
unambigously assigns narrow· scope to negation while the corresponding statement 
with every allows scope interaction between the two. This fact, noted by Davison 
(1980) for example, follows straightforwardly here. Assigning wide scope to 
negation would be tantamount to an assertion of existence since -'V � 3 -' .  This 
would run foul of the non-existence clause. The same would be true of the 
universal in object position. 
The behavior of any in downward entailing contexts has been extensively 
studied and the account I have given is certainly not meant to be exhaustive. The 
point I wish to emphasize is that the scope relation is accounted for in the present 
proposal in a manner that is not incompatible with theories of licensing in 
downward entailing contexts such as Ladusaw (1979) or Kadmon and Landman 
(1993) , to mention just two. There are other aspects of interpretation that have 
been discussed by Fauconnier (1975a and 1975b), Krifka (1990) and Lee and 
Hom ( 1994) having to do with the relative strength of statements with or without 
any in an scale of implicatures that I do not go into here. At an impressionistic 
level, however, a property-loaded statement will always be stronger than an 
individual-loaded statement and I would hope that insights from other theories 
could be incorporated into the present approach. But I must leave this for another 
occassion. 
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3.4. Modal Contexts 
I have made a distinction between non-existence, an absolute ban that 
prevents any from occuring in statements that entail existence, and contextual 
vagueness, a pragmatic constraint that comes into effect in those situations where 
there happen to exist individuals verifying the statement. In this subsection I will 
use this distinction to explain the distribution of any in modal contexts . 
Modal contexts, generally thought to license any, do not always do so . 
Modals of necessity, as opposed to modals of possibility, are resistant to any, as 
has been noted by Hom (1972) , Lasnik (1972) and Davison (1980) . Some 
relevant examples are given below: 
(43)a. You can pick any flower. 
b. * You must pick any flower. 
(44)a.  Any student could have got an A on the quiz. 
b. * Any student must have got an A on the quiz. 
(4S)a. Anyone can sign this. 
b. * Anyone must sign this. 
As far as I know, there is no clear explanation for this in the literature. Before 
attempting one, let us note that in each case subtrigging renders the context 
suitable for any: 
(46)a. You must pick any flower you see. 
b .  Any student who studied for the exam must have got an A on the quiz. 
c. Anyone who is interested in the matter must sign this. 
I will take the case of permission and command in (43a)-(43b) and (46a) 
to demonstrate how non-existence and contextual vagueness can account for these 
facts , adopting the approach of Lewis (1979) . Lewis explicates the difference 
between permission and command in terms of a sphere of permissibility, which 
denotes for each < t, W > a set of worlds , whose members are all permissible at 
t in w. ! and i represent command and permission respectively and . can be 
prefIxed to any sentence rb.  The utterance of !rb at t in w, contracts the current 
sphere of permissibility by removing all those accessible worlds in which 4> is 
false . The utterance of irb, on the other hand, expands the current sphere of 
permissibility to ensure that at least some world(s) in which rb is true is accessible 
from w. This means that after the execution of the command, rb will be true in 
the actual world, while after the execution of the permission rb may or may not 
be true at w. 
Applying this to the cases at hand, the execution of the permission (43a) 
does not ensure that 3X [flower(x) & pick(you,x)] will be true at w. Non-existence 
is satisfied and any is acceptable, as long as it is left vague which- flowers are at 
issue. 
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Keeping in mind that we only look at worlds in which the domain of 
quantification is non-empty, (43b) entails the offending statement 3X [jlower(x) & 
pick(you,x)] and is predictably ruled out. Subtrigging, of course, saves the 
situation because it leaves room for an empty domain of quantification. Now, the 
execution of the command contracts the sphere of permissibility as before. But 
of the worlds that remain, there are some in which the statement is vacuously 
true. No existence is asserted and the statement will be acceptable as long as 
contextual vagueness is satisfied. The statement cannot be uttered while pointing 
to a bunch of flowers that the speaker knows can be seen. 1 1  
Note that in this approach, it follows that (43a) will be ambigous between 
universal and indefinite readings. More needs to be said, of course, to account 
for the intuition that the pennission applies to any subset of the domain. Lewis 
( 1979) addresses the problem of detennining exactly how the set of worlds 
brought into the sphere of pennissibility is to be determined. An insightful 
discussion of the problem with special reference to any is also presented in Kamp 
(1973) but to go into this issue would take us outside the scope of the paper. Let 
me simply note that in (46b) the host NP can only be a universal since execution 
of a command with an indefmite would entail existence and be ruled out. And 
here our intuitions are clear, quantification is not over arbitrary subsets but over 
the whole set. 
An interesting consequence of this approach is that it predicts that 
subtrigging cannot repair, modals of necessity when an overt partitive is used. 
The relevant contrast is the following: 
(47)a. You can pick any of the flowers (you see) . 
b. Any of the students (who studied for the exam) could have got an A. 
c. Any of the people (who are interested in the matter) could sign this. 
(48)a. * You must pick any of the flowers (you see) . 
b. * Any of the students (who studied for the exam) must have got an A. 
c. * Any of the people (who are interested in the matter) must sign this . 
The defmite inside the partitive ensures that the domain of quantification is non­
empty and noun modification cannot have the usual effect of suspending this 
presupposition. Now, in the case of (47a) this does not matter since as we saw, 
execution of the pennission does not result in a flower being actually picked. In 
the case of (48a) , on the other hand, execution of the command will result in such 
a situation, violating the non-existence requirement. 
Earlier accounts of FC any, Hom (1972) and Lasnik (1972) for example, 
devote a lot of attention to explicating scope interaction. They have to navigate 
a tricky course when faced with the range of data we have looked at here. In the 
approach I have suggested, there is no difference between possibility and 
necessity operators with respect to their scope relation with any. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have presented a proposal for any in non-negative/non-modal contexts 
that pose a challenge to K&L's proposal . I have also shown how this account 
would extend to any in negative and modal contexts . In concluding this paper I 
would like to briefly comment on the relation between the two proposals. 
There are three basic ideas that K&L advance. The fIrst is that any 
attaches to an indefinite and like all indefInites NP's with any have no inherent 
. quantifIcational force. I have departed from this in two crucial ways. I allow 
any to attach to indefInites and universals .  As a result, NP internal 
quantifIcational force is admitted. K&L's essential insight, however, that any is 
not a basic detenniner setting the quantifIcational force, but is something that 
affects the domain of quantifIcation is preserved. 
This brings us to their second idea, that any impacts on the domain of 
quantifIcation by widening it. I have argued that any only occurs in property­
loaded statements, which can be thought of having this effect. The set of 
individuals that instantiate a property is always going to be bigger than the 
contextually restricted set that ordinary determiners take as their argument. To 
that extent, the present proposal incorporates widening. 
Finally, although I do not use the semantic criterion of strengthening, as 
defmed by K&L, the notion that a statement with any is stronger than a statement 
without it is not antithetical to my proposal . Property-loaded statements are 
stronger, in some intuitive sense, than individual-loaded statements. I have 
demonstrated, however, that this notion of strengthening cannot be used as a 
licensing principle . The Jiltematives I have proposed, non-existence and 
contextual vagueness draw on the modality that I believe is essential to any. 
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University of Pennsylvania and SALT 5 ,  University of Texas at Austin for 
comments and questions, in particular David Dowty, Manfred Krifka and Bill 
Ladusaw. All omissions and errors are my own. 
1 I indicate sentences where any is not acceptable as ungrammatical . It may be 
that in some cases the intuition is more that it is awkward rather than 
ungrammatical . 
2 Eisner (1994) actually attempts an explanation for the unusual scope properties 
of universal any. He notes that quantifIcation may be over all possible 
individuals ,  not just over individuals in the actual world. This has something in 
common with the approach I advocate . 
3 Vendler (1967) notes such examples as unacceptable . I disregard Vendler's  
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judgement since my infonnants accept them, without exception. 
4 Lee and Horn (1994) suggest that FC any is ruled out where an appropriate kind 
scale cannot be constructed. If I understand their proposal correctly, this suggests 
that (2a) should be compared to (i) and (4a) to (ii) : 
(i) John kissed even the ugliest woman. 
(ii) John kissed even the ugliest woman who came up to him . 
My informants do not find a significant contrast between (i) and (ii) . 
s Giannakidou (1994) and ( 1995) notes that subjunctive mood can license NPI's 
in Modem Greek. Her claim that non-veridicality is crucial to such licensing 
seems to be compatible with view being proposed here. 
6 Examples (24) , (25) and (3 1 )  are fashioned after those in Carlson (1977) where 
bare plurals, as opposed to ordinary NP's,  are argued to be kind-denoting tenns. 
1 Greg Carlson also pointed out to me that (33c) improves if the common noun 
is plural . Impressionistically, it seems to me that one adds a covert postnominal 
locative phrase like there. I have no explanation for why a similar enhancement 
of (33c) is not possible. 
S Note that (36a) , even if it were allowed by non-existence, would violate 
contextual vagueness. If the speaker observes John talking to various women but 
does not notice any property they have in common, he cannot make a universal 
statement unless he notices that John talks to every woman. But if so, there is 
a set of women that can be recovered from the context to which any will be 
anchored. It is only possible to balance universality of the claim with contextual 
vagueness if the relative clause provides a property that can be used in carving 
out a subset of the contextually given set of women. 
9 K&L's approach does not straightforwardly apply to questions . According to 
them, (ia) is a Yes/No question about a bigger set than (ib) and (iia) a constituent 
question about a bigger set than (iib): 
(i)a. Did you read any book? 
b. Did you read a book? 
(ii)a. Which books did any student read? 
b. Which books did some student read? 
A question A entails a question B, if a true answer to A is a true answer to B 
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984) . Suppose that the original restricted domain is 
the set of textbooks and the widened domain is the set of textbooks and novels . 
If I read a novel last night but no textbook, yes would be a truthful answer to (ia) 
but not to (iib) . Thus (ia) does not strengthen (ib) . In the case of (iia) and (iib) 
entailment goes through under weak but not strong exhaustivity . Suppose the 
student in the narrow domain read The Tin Drum and The Full Catastrophe, a 
strongly exhaustive answer to (iib) should include these and only these 
propositions. If someone in the wider domain read Past Continuous a strongly 
exhaustive answer to (iia) would list all three books. 
10 Addition of a possibility (but not necessity) modal in the relative clause seems 
to redeem both contexts : 
(i) John has any book that Mary could want. 
(ii) There is just about any book you could imagine in this library. 
The difference between possibility and necessity modals with respect to licensing 
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any is discussed in section 3 .4 .  
1 1  The susceptibility to pragmatic factors can also be seen in the case of (46b)­
(46c) . For (46b) the speaker must not have in mind a set of students who are 
known to have studied for the exam. Similarly, we would not accept (46c) if it 
was preceded by a request for everyone interested in the matter to raise their 
hands. The relevant subset cannot be known to the speaker. 
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